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I.   INTRODUCTION
Our tort system reflects the character and values of our society.1
Like any moral code, it strives to bring out the best in citizens while
discouraging the worst. To achieve these goals, the system must be
fair and comport with common sense; be predictable, so that citizens
can conform their conduct to the requisite norms; and encourage pro-
ductive behavior and demand personal accountability.
However, today’s tort system falls short of these goals.2 It has
drifted away from fault-based compensation to a system of social wel-
fare.3 It is sometimes unfair and too often encourages antisocial behav-
                                                                                                                   
* Managing partner of the law firm of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell in Tallahassee,
Florida. The author is a graduate of Eckerd College and the University of Virginia School
of Law. He represents the Florida Chamber of Commerce and affiliated business interests
in tort reform efforts before the Florida Legislature. He wishes to express his appreciation
to his law partner, Ms. Mary Chaisson, and Mr. David Ramba of the Florida League of
Cities, for their invaluable assistance in preparing this article.
1. See William A. Worthington, The “Citadel” Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the
Policy of Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 & n.8 (1995). A “tort” is a “private or civil wrong or
injury, including action for bad faith breach of contract, for which the court will provide a
remedy in the form of an action for damages.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 262-63.
3. Worker’s compensation (FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1997)) and automobile no-fault (FLA.
STAT. §§ 627.730-.7405 (1997)) are two examples of social welfare programs that have dis-
placed parts of Florida’s tort law system. In these and other similar instances, the welfare
program guarantees compensation without regard to fault, in exchange for relinquishing
traditional common law rights to sue in tort for personal injuries. See Seaboard Coast Line
R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1978); American Freight Sys., Inc. v. Florida Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Under Florida’s present tort
system, however, some claimants can receive compensation without regard to the fault of the
defendant, as in the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, or collect 100% of economic dam-
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ior. For example, Florida’s system permits a drunken driver to recover
damages primarily caused by his own drunkenness, if another person
also had some minimal responsibility for an accident.4 It permits a
plaintiff to sue for a “defect” in a product fifty or more years old—well
after the useful life of that product.5 It often requires a tortfeasor to
pay more than his or her fair share of a loss.6 It also permits one to be
punished repetitively for a single mistake.7
In 1997, the Florida Legislature proposed the Florida Accountabil-
ity and Individual Responsibility Liability Bill (FAIR Bill).8 The FAIR
Bill would place limits on vicarious liability, create a statute of repose
for products, establish an alcohol and drug defense, and impose com-
mon-sense limits on the imposition of punitive damages. The FAIR
Bill passed the House Financial Services Committee in the 1997 ses-
sion. Under the applicable House rule,9 the bill remains pending dur-
ing the 1998 session. The FAIR Bill, and other tort reform proposals,
will be the subject of intense debate in 1998.
In Part II, this Article demonstrates that prudent tort reform is
needed to ensure Florida’s economic productivity and enhance the
lives of individual citizens. Part III explains how modern Florida tort
law has fallen out of balance and become unpredictable, costly, and
unfair. Part IV highlights the FAIR Bill’s proposed reforms and shows
how these particular reforms will create a more just and predictable
liability system. Finally, the Article concludes that the FAIR Bill is a
step in the right direction for ensuring a fair and just tort system.
II.   THE BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM
Tort liability imposes significant costs on society.10 In 1991, the na-
tion spent $131.6 billion on tort litigation, representing 2.3% of our
                                                                                                                   
ages against a defendant only 5% at fault for those damages. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997).
Yet, these same claimants retain all traditional common law remedies in tort. See id.
4. See Livingston v. Smalley Transp. Co., 603 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); City
of Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So. 2d 889, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), overruled on other grounds,
502 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1987) (finding that the jury never clearly determined fault because they
were not provided with intoxication instructions).
5. Florida repealed its 12-year-old statute of repose in 1986 by deleting it from section
95.03(2), Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT § 95.03(2) (1985); see also Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp. v. Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen
L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Busi-
nesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & COM. 167, 175 & n.47 (1989).
6. See Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 1993) (holding that joint and several
liability is abolished only as to noneconomic damages).
7. See W. R. Grace & Co.—Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1994) (holding
that prior punitive damages assessed against the defendant do not preclude subsequent
awards against the same defendant for injuries arising from the same conduct).
8. Fla. HB 2117 (1997).
9. See FLA. H.R. RULE 96 (1996-98).
10. See Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois’ Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor’s Policy Explana-
tion, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 805, 809 nn.1, 16-17 (1996).
1998]                         PRO TORT REFORM 143
gross domestic product.11 In one recent year alone, state court juries in
the seventy-five largest urban areas awarded over $2.7 billion to
plaintiffs.12 Studies report that citizens pay a “tort tax” of $1200 per
individual, or nearly $5000 for a family of four.13 Some have estimated
that twenty percent of the cost of a ladder and fifty percent of the cost
of a football helmet is attributable to tort liability.14 The cost of the tort
system has risen sharply in the past thirty years15 and “at a pace far
faster than in any other modern, competitive economy.”16
As tort costs have increased, so too has the unpredictability of li-
ability, to the detriment of American commerce.17 Product manufac-
turers have become more risk averse, sacrificing research and innova-
tion for the safe harbor of product uniformity.18 Socially beneficial
products and services have not been developed, or have been with-
drawn from the market for fear of tort lawsuits.19 American competi-
tiveness in the worldwide market has suffered as well.20 These inequi-
ties have increased the unpredictability, and therefore the cost, of the
system, deterred commercial innovation, and stifled economic produc-
tivity.21
Tort liability imposes similar costs in Florida. A recent survey
shows that Florida’s small businesses—the economic engine of the
state—are significantly intimidated by the mere threat of liability.22
Eighty-five percent of those surveyed believe that liability laws im-
properly favor those who bring the suit.23 Sixty percent have real con-
cern about the possibility of a tort suit.24 The concern is so acute that
Florida businesses would rather be subject to a tax audit or OSHA in-
                                                                                                                   
11. See id. at 809 n.17.
12. See BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 24 (1996).
13. See Dillard, supra note 10, at 809 n.16.
14. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 250; Dillard, supra note 10, at 811 n.27.
15. See PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 3 (1991).
16. Id. (citation omitted).
17. See id. at 7-8.
18. See id.
19. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 245-49.
20. See Cortese & Blaner, supra note 5, at 173-86.
21. See id.; Worthington, supra note 1, at 230, 245-53.
22. See MASON DIXON & HANK FISHKIND, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT
BUSINESS SURVEY OF FLORIDA BUSINESS (1997) (presented at the FAIR Press Conference on
April 15, 1997) (on file with Fla. St. U. L. Rev., Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter SURVEY]. The
survey was taken from 772 business owners and executives from Florida firms with less than
500 employees. The interviews were conducted by telephone from March 24 through April
10, 1997. See also HENRY H. FISHKIND, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TORT
REFORM ON FLORIDA’S ECONOMY (1997) (on file with Fla. St. U. L. Rev., Tallahassee, Fla.)
[hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
23. See SURVEY, supra note 22, at 7.
24. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 2.
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spection than a liability suit.25 Similarly, Florida businesses would
rather lose their best customer or most valued employee than have to
defend a tort lawsuit.26 Close to 200 businesses indicated that they
have withheld, failed to develop, or refused to market products or
services to limit exposure to liability suits.27 These small businesses
consider tort reform as one of the three most important actions the
Florida Legislature could take on behalf of business.28
Empirical data confirm the benefits of sensible tort reform. A 1994
Stanford University study analyzed the impact of tort liability reforms
on economic performance, using data from seventeen industries in
states that had enacted tort reform.29 The study focused on whether
reforms had a significant impact on a state’s productivity and em-
ployment.30 The findings are notable. They demonstrate that a state’s
adoption of additional liability-reducing reforms generally enlarges
levels of output per worker and employment in a broad range of indus-
tries.31 In contrast, a state’s adoption of liability-increasing reforms
generally causes lower productivity and employment.32 The study
concludes that liability-decreasing reforms help a state’s economy, and
liability-increasing reforms hinder a state’s economy.33
Prudent tort reform will not pose a threat to public safety, as critics
suggest, or create tort immunity for wrongdoers.34 To the contrary, a
balanced system will enhance public safety, punish wrongdoers for
negligent conduct, and demand personal responsibility.35
The present system does little to advance public safety. Florida’s
citizens are not protected by a system that permits drunk drivers and
drug users to collect thousands for their own wrongdoing.36 They are
                                                                                                                   
25. See id. at 3; see also SURVEY, supra note 22, at 4.
26. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 3; see also, SURVEY, supra note 22, at 5.
27. See SURVEY, supra note 22, at app. 5.
28. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 2. Dr. Fishkind’s summary of findings
showed that almost 68% of the businesses surveyed named liability reform as one of the top
three issues to be addressed by the Legislature, and another 31% ranked it among the top 10
issues.
29. See THOMAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., LIABILITY REFORMS’ CAUSES AND ECONOMIC
IMPACTS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 27 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper,
No. 4989, 1995).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.; see also Dillard, supra note 10, at 816 n.43.
34. See George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY:
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184 (1988); Fla. HB 2117 (1997). The FAIR Bill does not create
absolute bars to liability or cap damages. The statute of repose is, at most, a temporal
limitation to suit, not a complete bar to liability. See id.
35. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Educ. Servs., PCB 97-06 (1997) (Economic Impact
Statement of Apr. 14, 1997) (on file with comm.).
36. See, e.g., Livingston v. Smalley Transp. Co., 603 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
(holding that the defendant could be held liable for the accident even though the driver was
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not protected when the law discourages small businesses and product
manufacturers from developing newer, safer products for fear of law-
suits.37 All citizens lose when tort liability is based not on fault, but on
how much insurance or savings one has.38
It is little wonder that studies have found that the expansion in tort
liability around the nation has had little impact on consumer safety. A
study by Professor George Priest demonstrated that while the number
of tort suits and insurance premiums rose sharply in the 1980s, injury
rates for consumers and workers, death rates for medical procedures,
and aviation accident rates declined no faster than in the 1970s when
premium costs and the volume of tort suits were much lower.39 Stated
more directly, Professor Priest found no empirical evidence whatso-
ever that the explosion in tort liability in the 1970s and ‘80s made so-
ciety any safer.40
If common sense reforms are enacted, Florida citizens will have a
system that requires compensation for wrongful conduct, that refuses
to reward drunken drivers and drug users, and that encourages busi-
nesses to invent and develop new and safer products and services. It is
the fair thing to do.
III.   FLORIDA TORT LAW: A SYSTEM OUT OF BALANCE
In the past thirty years, Florida’s judiciary has liberalized and ex-
panded tort liability, in part to remedy perceived historical anomalies.
In so doing, however, the court retained other legal relics that permit
wrongdoers to benefit from their own wrongs and require some tort-
feasors to pay more than their fair share of a loss. The result is a sys-
tem that is unpredictable, costly, and often just plain unfair.
A.   Contributory Negligence
Before 1973, Florida applied the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence.41 First adopted in Florida in 1886, the doctrine barred a
plaintiff from seeking damages for injuries caused by negligence if
the plaintiff was even 1% responsible for that loss.42 The supreme
court described it as, “[t]he injury must be ‘solely’ caused by the neg-
                                                                                                                   
50% at fault and there was evidence to suggest that the driver was under the influence of al-
cohol); see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997).
37. See SURVEY, supra note 22, at App. 5; George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of
Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects and Its Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31, 31
(1991).
38. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1987).
39. See HUBER & LITAN, supra note 15, at 5.
40. “[I]f courts had been attaching liability on grounds of accident prevention, then
claims and claims payouts would have mirrored the accident rate.” Id. at 5 (citation omit-
ted).
41. See Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700, 729 (1886).
42. See id.
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ligence of the defendant. It is not enough that it should be
‘essentially’ so caused.”43
While contributory negligence sometimes yielded harsh results, the
harshness was ameliorated by another common law doctrine—joint
and several liability. Joint and several liability provides that each de-
fendant is liable for the entire damage to the plaintiff, regardless of
that defendant’s percentage of real culpability.44 The doctrine derives
from the principal that “the act of one is the act of all.”45 Under joint
and several liability, the liability is “‘joint’ in that all defendants may
be joined to render compensation for an injury; it is ‘several’ in that
each defendant is liable for the entire damage amount; and it is ‘joint
and several’ in that no defendant’s liability is extinguished until the
plaintiff’s judgment is completely satisfied.”46 Joint and several liabil-
ity was considered a necessary evil under contributory negligence be-
cause principles of causation deemed injuries “indivisible,” and there
was no way to determine each tortfeasor’s degree of negligence.47
B.   The Illicit Union of Comparative Fault and Joint and Several
Liability
In Hoffman v. Jones,48 the Florida Supreme Court, describing con-
tributory negligence as “unjust” and “inequitable,” abolished the doc-
trine in favor of comparative negligence.49 The court reasoned that the
liability of the defendant should depend upon “what damages he
caused”50 because “[i]n the field of tort law, the most equitable result
that can ever be reached by a court is the equation of liability with
fault.”51 In addition, the court adopted “pure” comparative negligence,
under which a plaintiff is entitled to collect from each defendant his
proportionate share of damages, regardless of the degree of the plain-
tiff’s fault.52 Under this rule, a plaintiff can recover damages caused in
part by his own negligence, even if he is 99% responsible for his inju-
ries.53
                                                                                                                   
43. Id.
44. See Pamela Burch Fort et al., Florida’s Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent Prob-
lem, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 508-09 (1986).
45. Id. at 508.
46. Id. at 509.
47. See id.
48. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
49. Id. at 437.
50. Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted).
51. Id. at 438.
52. See id. (holding that “[i]f plaintiff and defendant are both at fault, the former may
recover, but the amount of his recovery may be only such proportion of the entire damages
plaintiff sustained as the defendant’s negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the
plaintiff and the defendant”).
53. See id. at 439.
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The Hoffman Court’s laudable goal of equating liability with fault
went unrealized, however, because the court neglected to correct an-
other historical anomaly at the same time—joint and several liabil-
ity.54 Since 1973, comparative negligence has coexisted with joint and
several liability, often yielding unfair results. Hoffman teaches that a
co-defendant responsible for 10% of a plaintiff’s loss should pay only
10% of the damages.55 But this is not the case in a multi-defendant
personal injury case, due to joint and several liability. Even today, a
tortfeasor 10% at fault can, under certain circumstances, be forced to
pay all of a plaintiff’s damages, or at least a much greater share than
his actual fault warrants.56
The inequity is best illustrated by the decision in Walt Disney
World Co. v. Wood.57 In Wood, a jury returned a verdict finding the
plaintiff 14% at fault, Walt Disney World 1% at fault, and the plain-
tiff’s fiancee (who was not joined as a defendant) 85% at fault.58 Be-
cause joint and several liability remained in effect at that time, Walt
Disney World was responsible for payment of 86% of the plaintiff’s
damages.59 The supreme court, however, declined to abolish joint and
several liability.60 In 1986, the Legislature abolished the doctrine with
regard to noneconomic damages, but only partially abolished it for
economic damages.61 Comparative negligence and joint and several li-
ability co-exist in Florida today, at times requiring persons to pay
more than their fair share of a loss.62
                                                                                                                   
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1997).
57. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
58. See id. at 199.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 202.
61. See Tort Reform and Insurance Act, ch. 86-160, § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755
(amending FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1985)). As for noneconomic damages, “each defendant is
liable for only his own percentage share of noneconomic damages.” Smith v. Department of
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987); see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2) (1997). As for economic
damages, “with respect to a party whose percentage of fault equals or exceeds that of a par-
ticular claimant, the court shall enter judgment . . . against that party on the basis of the
doctrine of joint and several liability.” Id. § 768.81(3). Joint and several liability continues to
apply to all actions in which damages (economic/noneconomic) do not exceed $25,000. See
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(5) (1997).
62. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997). In his dissent in Walt Disney World, Justice
McDonald explained the intrinsic unfairness of combining comparative fault with joint
and several liability in Florida’s tort system:
The doctrines of joint and several liability and contributory negligence are consis-
tent with each other. Each tortfeasor, as a part of the whole, is liable for the
whole. Comparative negligence, which does not bar, but reduces a recovery to the
extent of individual fault, requires a separation of fault between the injured party
and the other tortfeasors. It would be a mismatch of legal concepts to have a
separation theory for the plaintiffs and joint liability responsibility for defen-
dants. Comparative negligence recognized the ability of a court to determine and
apportion damages in relation to the harm caused. Joint and several, in contrast,
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In the last three decades, Florida citizens have witnessed other
revolutionary changes in tort liability that have contributed to the im-
balance in this state’s tort system. In 1976, the Florida Supreme Court
abolished the requirement of privity in tort and adopted strict liabil-
ity.63 Not long after, the court imposed upon automobile manufactur-
ers the obligation to make vehicles “crashworthy.”64 The court has also
reaffirmed the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, which departed
from the essential premise of Hoffman and imposed liability without
fault.65 In 1985, the Legislature repealed the statute of repose on
product liability actions, making manufacturers theoretically liable for
products 50, 75, or even 100 years old.66
Not surprisingly, as tort liability expanded, litigation exploded in
Florida. From 1975 to 1995, tort filings in Florida increased by 45%.67
From 1980 through 1994, tort filings increased 43%, while Florida’s
population increased by only 28%.68 Expanded liability has been prof-
itable for Florida claimants and their attorneys. Between 1991 and
1996, Florida claimants had a 61% probability of recovering a personal
injury verdict, while the national average was only 50%.69 In 1997, the
median personal injury award in Florida was a whopping 40% higher
than the national median.70
IV.   THE FAIR BILL: A FIRST STEP TOWARD SENSIBLE TORT REFORM
During the 1997 legislative session, the House Committee on Fi-
nancial Services, chaired by Representative “Sandy” Safley,71 intro-
                                                                                                                   
presumes the inability of the judiciary to divide fault among parties. We have
now said that we can. Accordingly, when the comparative negligence doctrine
comes into play, as it did in this case, the law of joint and several liability should
be repudiated and each defendant held accountable for only the percentage of
damage determined by the trier of fact to have been caused by his conduct.
Id. at 202 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
63. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976) (holding that “a
manufacturer may be liable under the theory of strict liability in tort, as distinct from breach
of implied warranty of merchantability”).
64. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1981) (holding that because colli-
sions are foreseeable events, “the scope of the liability should be commensurate with the
scope of foreseeable risks”).
65. See Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990);
see also Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1959).
66. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1997) (providing for a four-year statute of limitation for
product liability actions, without a statute of repose); see also Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp. v. Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
67. See OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 12, at 26.
68. See Florida Chamber of Com., Issue Brief: Characteristics of the Disposition of Neg-
ligence Cases in Florida, 1980-94, in FLORIDA’S COMPARATIVE FAULT LAW 8-11 (1995) (an
economic consulting services special report prepared for the Florida Chamber of Commerce).
69. See JURY VERDICT RES. SERV., 1997 FLORIDA VERDICT SURVEY 12 (Lynn Godfrey &
Traci Stocker eds., 1997).
70. See id. at 13.
71. Repub., Clearwater.
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duced and ultimately reported favorably on House Bill 2117, the FAIR
Bill. The FAIR Bill is a modest first step toward meaningful tort re-
form. In summary, the bill creates a twelve-year statute of repose for
product liability actions;72 limits vicarious liability for injuries caused
by dangerous instrumentalities;73 creates a common sense alcohol and
drug defense;74 limits joint and several liability in cases with damages
less than $25,000;75 limits repetitive punitive damages, 76 and clarifies
the wrongful intent required for imposition of punitive damages.77
A.   Statute of Repose
In West v. Caterpillar ,78 the Florida Supreme Court adopted strict
liability and greatly expanded the scope of liability for retailers and
manufacturers of products.79 Dispensing with time-honored concepts of
privity and fault, the court held that a retailer or manufacturer could
be held liable for injuries suffered by a remote user of a product, re-
gardless of the care taken in designing or manufacturing that product,
if the product was found to be “unreasonably dangerous.”80 That stan-
dard requires a careful, complex evaluation of the risks of injury posed
by a product, compared with the utility and cost of its design, its use-
fulness to society as a whole, and the ability to make the product safer
at a reasonable cost.81
Unfortunately, Florida juries are not instructed on the necessary
elements of this analysis. Rather, the jury is summarily instructed
that a product is “unreasonably dangerous” and therefore defective if,
by reason of its design or manufacture, “the product fails to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect, . . . or if the risk of dan-
                                                                                                                   
72. See Fla. HB 2117, § 2 (1997).
73. See id. § 3.
74. See id. § 4.
75. See id. § 8.
76. See id. § 6.
77. See id. § 7.
78. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
79. See id. at 89.
80. Id.
81. See Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 1979). Among the
factors that must be considered in this analysis are:
“(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other
and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its
probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge
and normal public expectation of danger (particularly for established prod-
ucts), (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the
effect of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger
without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly
expensive.”
Id. at 1170 (quoting an uncited article by Dean Wade). See also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d
726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976); see generally Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d
329, 331 (Fla. 1983); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1145-46 & n.9 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981).
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ger in the product outweighs the benefits.”82 Thus, a finding of defect
in Florida is nothing more than a retrospective second guess about
complex, sophisticated design or manufacturing choices made by sci-
entists and engineers years before.83 Stated another way,
“[y]esterday’s products are measured against tomorrow’s possibili-
ties.”84
Worse, retailers and manufacturers retain virtually unlimited ex-
posure for alleged defects in their products. Under Florida law, a
plaintiff can sue for a defective product even if that product is 50, 75,
or 100 years old—well after the product has reached the end of its use-
ful life.85 Such unlimited exposure is both unfair and unwise. It leaves
retailers and manufacturers unable to predict contingent liabilities
and discourages the innovation and introduction of new products.86
The problem is real, and one that has caused tangible harm to
Florida’s citizens. In 1991, Piper Aircraft of Vero Beach filed for pro-
tection under Chapter Eleven of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, report-
ing that the potential for product liability litigation involving older
planes had scared off potential lenders.87 The fifty-four-year-old Flor-
ida company once had more than 3200 employees in four plants; on
the day it sought Chapter Eleven protection, the company had only
forty-five employees.88
The FAIR Bill cures this inequity by reinstating a statute of repose
for product liability actions. It provides that an action claiming a
product defect must be commenced no later than twelve years after the
product leaves the possession and control of the manufacturer.89 As
                                                                                                                   
82. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES § PL 5 (1997).
83. See generally Cortese & Blaner, supra note 5, at 187 & nn. 118-121.
84. Worthington, supra note 1, at 247 (citation omitted).
85. Florida’s 12-year statute of repose for strict products liability claims was repealed in
1986. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA
1996); see also Cortese & Blaner, supra note 5, at 175 & n.47.
86. See Cortese and Blaner, supra note 5, at 187-91. A design engineer in Florida is
faced with an intractable dilemma due to this exposure for unlimited product liability. If an
engineer develops a simple, inexpensive way to improve the safety of a 20-year-old widget,
the present state of Florida law discourages that innovation. If a product liability suit is
brought seeking damages for personal injuries arising from use of the 20-year-old widget, the
plaintiff lawyer will use the newer, safer design as proof that the earlier design was
“unreasonably dangerous.” Thus, the perpetual risk of liability concerning the older widget
creates disincentives to the improvement of that product. See id.
87. See Piper Aircraft Seeks Chapter 11 Protection, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1991, at D1.
88. See id. In 1970, private aircraft manufacturers produced 17,000 planes. In 1987,
they produced less than 1100 planes. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 249. In large part be-
cause of the risk of perpetual product liability in the aircraft industry, thousands of aircraft
workers were laid off, unemployment in the industry was over 50%, and the cost of liability
insurance averaged $100,000 per plane produced. See W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 8 (1991). In response to this liability crisis, Congress passed the General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994, which was signed into law on August 17, 1994. It created an 18-
year statute of repose in actions against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft. See Gen-
eral Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
89. See Fla. HB 2117, § 2 (1997).
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the Florida Supreme Court noted, a statute of repose evinces a
“rational and legitimate” policy that recognizes “perpetual liability
places an undue burden on manufacturers.”90 It is based on the com-
mon-sense notion that “liability should be restricted to a time com-
mensurate with the normal useful life of manufacturer products.”91
Key states with which Florida competes for economic development,
such as Georgia92 and Illinois,93 have similar statutes of repose.
The FAIR Bill’s statute of repose will not abolish an injured per-
son’s right to sue for injuries related to the use of a product.94 It would
limit only those actions brought for the allegedly defective design or
manufacture of a product where injuries occur more than twelve years
after the product leaves the possession of the manufacturer.95 A plain-
tiff will continue to have the right to sue for the negligent repair of a
product, its negligent use, or negligent alteration of a product.96
B.   Vicarious Liability
Section three of the FAIR Bill modifies a historical relic that is in-
consistent with modern tort law—vicarious liability for use of danger-
ous instrumentalities.97
Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the owner or lessor
of an automobile is held strictly liable for damages suffered by a third
party due to the negligence of the person to whom the owner or lessor
entrusted the automobile.98 Liability is not based on the owner’s negli-
gence or fault in entrusting the vehicle; rather, it is based solely on
ownership of the product and the original consent given to another to
use the product.99 The doctrine has been expanded beyond the per-
missive use of automobiles to golf carts and other products.100
                                                                                                                   
90. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985).
91. Id. at 660.
92. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (1997).
93. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-213(c)(1) (West 1997).
94. The statute cannot constitutionally be applied to situations where a person uses or
consumes a product that inflicts injury within the 12-year period (giving rise to an accrued
cause of action), but where injury does not manifest itself until after the period of repose. See
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 283 (Fla. 1990); Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 397 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 1981); Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659.
95. See Fla. HB 2117, § 2 (1997).
96. See id.
97. See id. § 3.
98. See Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1367 (Fla. 1990);
Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 835-36 (Fla. 1959) (holding the owner of a
car liable when the owner consents to the use of the vehicle “beyond his own immediate con-
trol”); Lynch v. Walker, 31 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1947).
99. See Susco Car Rental Sys., 112 So. 2d at 835-36.
100. See Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984) (golf carts); Paterson v. Deeb, 472
So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding the owner liable for the conduct of the thief); see
also Gomez v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 596 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Stupak v. Win-
ter Park Leasing, Inc., 589 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Lambert v. Indian River Elec.,
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Florida’s application of this doctrine is not in line with the national
mainstream. Prosser and Keeton note that Florida is the only state
that imposes such absolute liability:
If the owner is not present in the car, but has entrusted it to a
driver who is not his servant, there is merely a bailment, and there
is usually no basis for imputing the driver’s negligence to the
owner. It is here that the owner’s liability to the injured plaintiff
stops at common law. Only the Courts of Florida have gone the
length of saying that an automobile is a “dangerous instrumental-
ity” for which the owner remains responsible when it is negligently
driven by another.101
The Florida Supreme Court admitted as much in 1993 in Hertz Corp.
v. Jackson.102
The doctrine is also fundamentally at odds with modern Florida
tort law. Because liability is gauged by one’s status and not one’s fault,
the doctrine contravenes Hoffman103 and the comparative fault stat-
ute.104 Because liability is vicarious rather than direct, the doctrine
provides no guidance on how one can avoid or limit potential liability.
The result is liability that is unpredictable (and therefore costly) and
unfair.
Not surprisingly, the state’s statutory and common law have moved
toward limiting, if not abrogating, the dangerous instrumentality doc-
trine. In 1986, the Legislature abolished the doctrine with respect to
long-term lease arrangements, provided that the lessee obtains certain
levels of bodily injury liability and property damage insurance.105
Perhaps most significantly, only months ago the Florida Supreme
Court adopted negligent entrustment in Florida, under which a prop-
erty owner is liable for injuries to a third person only if the owner was
negligent in entrusting the property to a wrongdoer.106 This concept,
unlike the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, is faithful to Florida’s
efforts to equate liability with fault, and is a much fairer way to im-
pose liability against owners of personal property.
                                                                                                                   
Inc., 551 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Michalek v. Shumate, 524 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1988);
Tribbitt v. Crown Contractors, Inc., 513 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
101. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 523-24 (5th
ed. 1984).
102. 617 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1993) (stating that “[i]t appears that Florida is the only
jurisdiction that imposes . . . strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who
voluntarily entrusts it to another”).
103. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
104. FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997).
105. See Act Effective Oct. 1, 1986, ch. 86-229, 1986 Fla. Laws 1771, 1772 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 324.021 (9) (1985)).
106. See Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 22 Fla. L. Weekly S435, S438 (Fla. July 17, 1997)
(finding the store negligent for selling a firearm to an obviously intoxicated customer who
subsequently shot the petitioner).
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Under the FAIR Bill, the owner of personal property would not be
vicariously liable for the negligent operation of the property by an-
other, provided that the user has or obtains insurance containing lim-
its of not less than $100,000 and $300,000 for bodily injury, or com-
bined limits of $500,000.107 This provision would provide a substantial
layer of protection to one injured by the negligent use of someone else’s
property, while moving Florida law in the direction of equating liabil-
ity with fault.
C.   Alcohol and Drug Defense
Alcohol and drugs kill with tragic frequency and societal cost. In
1996, there were 973 alcohol- or drug-related fatalities, 23,145 alcohol-
or drug-related injuries, and 25,362 alcohol- or drug-related crashes in
Florida.108
In Florida, the use of alcohol and drugs can also pay. Under the
present tort system, a drunk driver can be primarily responsible for
his own injuries, but still collect thousands of dollars in compensation
if another person was partially responsible for that loss.109 Take, for
example, a two-car collision at an intersection. Drunk Driver is young
and severely intoxicated at the time of the accident, with a 3.0 blood
alcohol level. Sober Driver is an elderly, usually careful driver. Drunk
Driver runs a red light and careens into the intersection at high speed.
Sober Driver enters the intersection at a reasonable speed, but fails to
react quickly enough to avoid the collision. Drunk Driver is rendered a
quadriplegic, while Sober Driver escapes with a broken leg. The jury
finds Drunk Driver 90% responsible, incurring damages of $4 million.
Sober Driver is 10% responsible for the accident, with damages of
$20,000. Under this scenario, the drunk driver would recover a judg-
ment against the sober, elderly citizen for $382,000. This result re-
wards criminal conduct and is unconscionable.
Section four of the FAIR bill is an alcohol and drug defense that in-
fuses some common sense into the system and prohibits compensation
under these circumstances.110 This provision would permit a defendant
to assert drug or alcohol impairment of the plaintiff as a defense if the
plaintiff was under the influence of drugs or alcohol and if, as a result
of being under the influence, the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault
for his own injuries.111 The defense would not apply to over-the-counter
or prescription drugs.112
                                                                                                                   
107. See Fla. HB 2117, § 3 (1997).
108. See DEPARTMENT OF HIGH. SAF. & MOTOR VEH., TRAFFIC CRASH FACTS 5 (1996).
109. See, e.g., Livingston v. Smalley Trans. Co., 603 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA
1992).
110. See Fla. HB 2117, § 4 (1997).
111. See id.
112. See id.
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This proposal is simple and fair. It embodies Florida’s strong public
policy against the use of drugs and alcohol.113 It requires an individual
to assume responsibility for his own wrongful conduct.
D.   Comparative Fault/Joint and Several Liability
In Fabre v. Marin,114 the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the un-
derlying premise of Hoffman—that liability should equate with
fault.115 There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10%
at fault paying 100% of the loss, and there is no valid social policy that
should compel defendants to pay more than their fair share of the loss.
Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them. If one of the parties
at fault happens to be a spouse or a governmental agency and if by
reason of some competing social policy the plaintiff cannot receive
payment for his injuries from the spouse or agency, there is no com-
pelling social policy that requires the co-defendant to pay more than
his fair share of the loss.116
Unfortunately, Florida tort law still falls short of this goal. Joint
and several liability persists in all actions where damages are less
than $25,000. In cases involving more than $25,000 in damages, joint
and several liability still applies to economic damages in some in-
stances.117
Section eight of the FAIR Bill partially rectifies this inequity by
applying Florida’s partial abolition of joint and several liability to
smaller cases with total damages of less than $25,000.118 A person
should pay only her fair share of a loss, no matter how big or small the
case.
E.   Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are, simply put, “out of control.”119 The punish-
ment is erratic, often does not fit the offense, and fails to distinguish
                                                                                                                   
113. See Kitchen v. K-Mart, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S435, S438 (Fla. July 17, 1997) (applying
negligent entrustment to a store for selling a firearm to an obviously intoxicated customer
who subsequently shot the petitioner, thus equating liability with fault).
114. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
115. See id. at 1185.
116. See id. at 1187 (citing Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978)).
117. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1997).
118. See Fla. HB 2117, § 8 (1997).
119. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, COMMENTS BEFORE THE UNITED
STATES SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 2 (1995) (summarizing Mr. Schwartz’s testimony be-
fore Congress on the imposition of punitive damages) (on file with author) [hereinafter
SCHWARTZ’S SENATE COMMENTS]; Dillard, supra note 10, at 807 n.10; Robert D. Cooter, Puni-
tive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1145-46 (1989);
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 975-
76, 987-88 (1989) [hereinafter Ellis, Punitive Damages]; Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for
Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Product Li-
ability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 940-41 (1989); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment
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negligent from truly egregious conduct.120 An editorial from The Wash-
ington Post presented it this way: “Legislation is needed because pu-
nitive damages are wildly unpredictable, so arbitrary as to be unfair
and awarded without any guidance to juries, which simply pick num-
bers out of the air.”121 The inequity in modern punitive awards has
even prompted the United States Supreme Court to become active in
the field, despite a long-held reluctance to intervene in state law is-
sues.122
1.   The Expansion of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not intended to compensate a claimant. They
are awarded solely for the purpose of punishing truly egregious con-
duct and deterring others from similar misconduct.123 Their existence
is derived from public policy, not individual entitlement. The Florida
Supreme Court made that clear in 1992:
Unlike the right to compensatory damages, the allowance of pu-
nitive damages is based entirely upon considerations of public pol-
icy. Accordingly, it is clear that the very existence of an inchoate
claim for punitive damages is subject to the plenary authority of
the ultimate policy-maker under our system, the legislature. In the
exercise of that discretion, it may place conditions upon such a re-
covery or even abolish it altogether.124
Forty years ago, punitive damage verdicts were unusually rare.125
Times have changed. Both the frequency of punitive claims and the
magnitude of punitive awards have increased dramatically since
then.126 From 1968 to 1971, in the states of Florida, California, Texas,
New York, and Illinois, ninety-one punitive damage awards were af-
firmed on appeal, totaling $1.4 million.127 Twenty years later, between
1988 and 1991, the same states had 433 punitive damage awards af-
                                                                                                                   
on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986); Dorsey D. Ellis,
Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 55-60
(1982) [hereinafter Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency].
120. See SCHWARTZ’S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 1-2; see also Dillard, supra
note 10, at 807 n.10.
121. Editorial, Trial Lawyers’ Triumph, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1996, at A16.
122. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alli-
ance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991); Browning-Ferris Ind. v. Kelco Disposal., Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
123. See Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986).
124. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992) (citation omitted).
125. See GEORGE L. PRIEST, COMMENTS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES TORT REFORM 2 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter
PRIEST’S SENATE COMMENTS].
126. See id.
127. See STEPHEN M. TURNER ET AL., WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES EXPLOSION: FACT OR FICTION? 2, 4 (1992).
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firmed on appeal, totaling $342.9 million.128 “By all measures, punitive
damage award amounts increased dramatically between 1985-1989
and 1990-1994.”129 In addition, the frequency of punitive claims has af-
fected the settlement process, both increasing the litigation rate and
increasing the ultimate magnitude of settlements.130
This explosion in punitive damage awards is attributable to at least
two factors. First, while punitive damages were historically limited to
a narrow class of intentional torts such as battery and trespass, courts
in modern times have expanded punitive liability for less than inten-
tional misconduct.131 The standards governing this liability are at best
fuzzy, at worst, incomprehensible.132 For example, in Florida a jury
might be told that punitive damages are appropriate to punish
“wanton” conduct.133 Few jurors understand what that standard
means (or, just as importantly, what it does not mean) and even fewer
citizens can discern how to conform their conduct to avoid committing
“wanton conduct.”134 The result is wildly erratic and unpredictable
punitive awards.135
Second, courts have begun to impose repetitive awards against a
defendant for a single course of conduct, particularly in the field of
product liability.136 The policies underlying punitive damages, and so-
ciety as a whole, are poorly served by punishing a defendant time and
again for a single course of conduct. Federal Circuit Judge Henry
Friendly noted in 1967 that “we have the greatest difficulty in perceiv-
ing how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions
throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill.”137
In fact, overkill is precisely what has occurred. Multiple windfall re-
coveries of punitive damages deplete a defendant’s limited resources
                                                                                                                   
128. See id.
129. ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985 40 (1996).
130. See PRIEST’S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 2.
131. See SCHWARTZ’S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 4; see also Adams v. Whit-
field, 290 So. 2d 49, 51-52 (Fla. 1974) (holding that evidence of legal malice, not actual malice,
is needed to justify a punitive damage award).
132. See Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531-32 (Fla. 1974)
(holding that punitive damages were available for “evil-doing,” “outrageous highhandedness,”
or for conduct committed with “malice, moral turpitude, [or] wantonness”) (citation omitted).
133. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES § PD(a)(2)(3) (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; see also Glickstein v. Setzer, 78 So. 2d 374, 375
(Fla. 1955).
134. 1997 CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 133; see also Glickstein, 78 So. 2d at 375.
135. See Jeffries, supra note 119, at 139; see also Cooter, supra note 118, at 1145-46; El-
lis, Punitive Damages, supra note 119, at 975-76, 987-88; Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency, supra
note 119, at 55-60; Wheeler, supra note 119, at 940-41.
136. See W. R. Grace & Co.—Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1994); see also
SCHWARTZ’S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 1, 4.
137. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
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and endanger the ability of future claimants to recover even compen-
satory damages.138
Even the threat of repetitive punitive awards can drive a company
into bankruptcy. Dow-Corning Corporation is a recent example. When
breast implant recipients began to experience unexplained symptoms
of malaise, plaintiffs’ attorneys throughout the country flooded the
judicial system with lawsuits, claiming that silicone breast implants
were defective.139 Faced with years of future litigation, including mul-
tiple punitive damages awards, Dow-Corning offered to create a fund
of $2 billion—at the time the largest single settlement fund in modern
American history. at that time140 In order to preserve the integrity of
this fund and to maintain its financial viability, Dow-Corning sought
class action certification to foreclose repetitive punitive awards by opt-
out claimants.141 Nonetheless, Dow-Corning succumbed to Chapter
Eleven bankruptcy in 1995, putting the settlement fund in jeopardy,
or at least delaying the availability of these billions to pay compensa-
tory damages.142
Even worse, despite thousands of pending claims, there is precious
little, if any, scientific proof that silicone implants are defective.143 The
United States District Court for the District of Oregon convened an
independent panel of scientists and medical experts to assess the pro-
bative value of plaintiffs’ proffered evidence that silicone implants
cause auto-immune disease.144 After exhaustive analysis by the inde-
pendent panel and full presentations by plaintiffs’ and defendants’ ex-
perts, the judge concluded that there was no competent scientific evi-
dence to show that breast implants cause auto-immune disease.145 Yet,
because of the mere pendency of thousands of costly lawsuits, as well
as the corrosive threat of multiple punitive damage awards in the fu-
ture, Dow-Corning Corporation remains mired in bankruptcy.146
                                                                                                                   
138. See SCHWARTZ’S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 5-6.
139. See Joseph Nocera, Dow-Corning Succumbs, FORTUNE, Oct. 30, 1995, at 137; Rich-
ard Hazelton, The Tort Monster That Ate Dow-Corning, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at A21.
140. See Memorandum of Law of Defendants Dow-Corning Corporation and Dow-
Corning Wright Corporation in Support of Their Motion for Certification of a Mandatory
Class Action as to Punitive Damages, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litiga-
tion, No. CV 92-P-10000-S (N.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 1994).
141. See id.
142. See Voluntary Petition, In re Dow-Corning Corp., No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
May 15, 1995); see also Nocera, supra note 139, at 137; Hazelton, supra note 139, at A21.
143. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Or. 1996).
144. See id. at 1392-94.
145. See id. at 1394, 1414-15.
146. See id. at 1394, 1402, 1407, 1411, 1417; see also, Nocera, supra note 139, at 137; Ha-
zelton, supra note 139, at A21.
The breast implant controversy is far from over. On July 30, 1997, Bankruptcy Judge Ar-
thur J. Spector ruled that common issue causation trials should be held in Dow-Corning’s
Chapter 11 case to resolve the threshold question of whether scientific evidence supports
claims that breast implants cause disease. See Court Issues Opinion That Common Issue
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The devastating effect of punitive damages extends beyond the cor-
porate entity. Bankruptcy forces employees to lose their jobs. Small
businesses that rely on the company for income lose their business and
also their employees. Economic harm to the company also affects
shareholders, pension funds, and investors, who face a loss of their
savings.
The threat of multiple punitive damage awards has an equally
detrimental impact on settled cases. Judge Weis of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit recently wrote:
[T]he potential for punitive awards is a weighty factor in settle-
ment negotiations and inevitably results in a larger settlement
agreement than would ordinarily be obtained. To the extent that
this premium exceeds what would otherwise be a fair and reason-
able settlement for compensatory damages, assets that could be
available for satisfaction of future compensatory claims are dissi-
pated.147
Similarly, in repetitive or mass tort litigation, the threat of repetitive
punitive damage awards makes a comprehensive settlement more dif-
ficult and limits the ability of a claimant to recover quickly for his in-
jury.148 The Director of the Federal Judicial Center has written that
“[b]arring successive punitive damage awards against a defendant for
the same conduct would remove the major obstacle to settlement of
mass tort litigation and open the way for the prompt resolution of the
damage claims of many thousands of injured plaintiffs.”149
2.   Reform Is Needed, Even if Punitive Damages Are Few
The infrequency of punitive damage awards does not diminish their
inequity or adverse impact on society. It is not the frequency of puni-
tive damages awards that is the problem, but rather the erratic, un-
                                                                                                                   
Causation Trials Should Resolve Legal Debate on Breast Implants, FINANCIAL NEWS, July,
30, 1997, at 8. No causation trial has yet been scheduled. On August 25, 1997, Dow-Corning
announced a proposed reorganization plan, which could provide $2.4 billion for resolving
breast implant claims, depending upon the number of claimants voting to accept the plan.
See Dow-Corning Announces New Plan of Reorganization to Resolve Chapter 11 Filing,
FINANCIAL NEWS, Aug. 25, 1997, at 2. As more people vote in support of the plan, individual
settlement amounts increase, because less money is required for the trial process. See id. The
Bankruptcy Court has not yet ruled on this plan of reorganization. See id.
On August 19, 1997, a jury in Louisiana rendered a verdict against Dow Chemical, one of
Dow-Corning’s parents, finding that Dow Chemical had failed to investigate or had concealed
evidence concerning the health risks of breast implants. See Spitzfaden v. Dow Corning
Corp., No. 92-2589 (Orleans Parish Civ. Dist. Ct. 1997). That jury verdict did not, however,
address the question of whether breast implants caused the pervasive disease claimed by
plaintiffs. On December 3, 1997, a Louisiana judge decertified the suit as a class action. See
Pamela Coyle, Implant Suit in Pieces After Ruling Cases Not Alike, Judge Decides, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 2, 1997, at A1.
147. Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1398 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting).
148. See Nocera, supra note 139, at 137; Hazelton, supra note 139, at A21.
149. William W. Schwarzer, Punishment Ad Absurdum, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 116.
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predictable, and repetitive nature of these awards.150 The result is a
chilling effect on innovation, American competitiveness, and the intro-
duction of socially beneficial products.151
Moreover, statistics show that the total dollar amount of punitive
damages is substantial, both in Florida and across the nation. A recent
Rand Corporation study notes that “punitive damage award amounts
increased dramatically between 1985-1989 and 1990-1994.”152 It also
concluded that “[b]ecause punitive damage awards have increased so
substantially, punitive damages represent a large portion of overall to-
tal damages awarded—approximately half in some jurisdictions.”153 In
Florida, juries have awarded punitive damages over 150 times since
1989, totaling $481 million.154 Data also show that from 1992 to 1994
Texas, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee affirmed punitive damage
awards on appeal in 158 cases.155 Thus, in Florida, California, and the
four states mentioned above, there have been at least 561 punitive
damage awards since 1989.
3.   Sensible Reform
The FAIR Liability Act takes some prudent initial steps to return
equity to the award of punitive damages in Florida. First, the FAIR
Bill would prohibit repetitive punitive damage awards for the same
course of conduct, if the defendant established before trial that puni-
tive damages had been awarded in a prior action in Florida involving
the same act or course of conduct.156 A repetitive award would none-
theless be permitted if the court makes specific findings of fact that
the earlier award was insufficient to punish the defendant’s behav-
ior.157
Second, the FAIR Bill clarifies the type of misconduct that should
be punished.158 A plaintiff must prove that the misconduct was inten-
tional, which is defined as conduct which the defendant knew to be
                                                                                                                   
150. See SCHWARTZ’S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 2.
151. See Jeffries, supra note 119, at 139; see also Coiter, supra note 119, at 1145-46; Ellis,
Punitive Damages, supra note 119, at 975-76, 987-88; Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency, supra
note 118, at 55-60; Wheeler, supra note 119, at 940-41.
152. MOLLER, supra note 129, at 40.
153. Id.
154. See GEORGE MEROS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES SURVEY: 1989-1996 (1997) (compiling in-
formation from the punitive damage statistics in the FLORIDA JURY VERDICT REPORTER from
1989-1996) (on file with author).
155. See SCHWARTZ’S SENATE COMMENTS, supra note 119, at 16.
156. See Fla. HB 2117, § 7(2)(a) (1997). The Florida Supreme Court noted in W. R. Grace
& Co.—Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla. 1994), that only Congress could resolve de-
finitively the problem of repetitive punitive damage awards, due to the limited reach of indi-
vidual state legislation. However, in the absence of a comprehensive federal solution, an in-
cremental improvement in Florida is at least a step in the right direction.
157. See Fla. HB 2117, §7(2)(b) (1997).
158. See id. § 6.
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wrongful, or conduct that the defendant knew had a high probability
of causing injury.159
Third, the FAIR Bill requires that the plaintiff prove the right to
punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence,160 a standard that
has been embraced by a number of other states, including California,
Texas, Kentucky, and North Carolina.161 Because the imposition of
punitive damages is penal in nature and tantamount to a fine, it
should be imposed only under an enhanced burden of proof, just as is
required when one is subject to a governmental fine or a criminal
penalty.
V.   CONCLUSION
It all comes down to fairness and common sense. It is not fair to
permit a drunk driver to collect damages for his own misconduct. It
defies common sense to permit one to claim a defect in a product that
is thirty or fifty years old. It is wrong to base liability on the mere
ownership of property rather than one’s fault, and it is just as wrong to
make a wrongdoer pay more than his or her fair share of a loss. It of-
fends basic notions of justice to punish one repetitively for a single act
of misconduct.
Florida can have a system that protects the safety of its citizens
and provides fair compensation to injury victims, yet demands socially
responsible conduct and personal accountability. House Bill 2117 is a
prudent first step in the right direction.
                                                                                                                   
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie 1996); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Michie 1997); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-1-65 (1)(a) (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(b) (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-
11 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (1996); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a)
(West 1997).
